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Abstract
Is deregulation sufficient to grant free entry in local credit markets? Economic theory
suggests at least two ways in which asymmetric information between incumbents and
entrants can work as an endogenous barrier to entry. First, entrants’ pool of applicants
contains a larger share of potential customers who are not creditworthy because it includes
all those would-be borrowers who were previously rejected by mature banks in the market.
Second, since a substantial amount of the information used by banks to screen loan
applicants and monitor borrowers is generated through repeated interaction with their
customers and the local business community, incumbents’ creditworthiness tests are likely to
be more accurate. Other things being equal, entrants are therefore expected to experience
higher loan default rates than incumbents. Using a unique database of 7,275 observations on
729 individual banks’ lending in 95 Italian local markets, we find that both adverse selection
and informational disadvantage play a significant role in explaining entrants’ loan default
rates. We argue that these endogenous barriers can help to explain why in many local credit
markets by domestic and foreign banks was slow, even after substantial deregulation.
JEL classification: D82, G21, L13
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1
Geographical restrictions and legal barriers to entry into banking markets have been
progressively relaxed since the late 1970s in the United States, Europe, both at country and
European Union level
2, and many other countries. The lifting of regulatory constraints has
been followed by an increase in competition that has led to substantial gains in terms of
consumer welfare.
3 However, US banks have been slow to move into new markets and
cross-border banking in Europe is still limited, particularly in the retail market.
4 Meanwhile,
banking crises that have erupted in several countries around the world have been traced
directly or indirectly to the repeal or relaxation of regulatory entry barriers.
5
Is there anything special about banking services that makes entrants face additional
entry costs, different from those paid by entrants in other markets, even when regulatory
restrictions are lifted? Were the social benefits of increased competition, in terms of higher
efficiency, higher deposit rates and lower loan rates, a free ride? Answering these questions
is very important for policy reasons.
If entry barriers inherently linked with the nature of credit markets do exist, then
geographical segmentation is likely to be a persistent feature of financial markets, regardless
of deregulation and technological advances.
6 This implies that allowing for market free entry
may not be sufficient to help local financial development, which has been proved to play a
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2 See Berger et al. (1995) and Vives (1991) for a survey of the major regulatory changes in the US and in the
European Union respectively.
3 Hannan and Prager (1998) and Angelini and Cetorelli (2003).
4 As documented in Buch (2002) and Danthine et al. (1999).
5 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2001), analyzing a sample of 53 countries, show that financial liberalization
increases the probability of a bank crisis. Caprio and Klingebiel (2000) document a recent increase in the
frequency of crises, attributing it at least in part to the lifting of structural controls. Pesola (2001) finds that
market liberalization had a substantial role in bank crises in the Scandinavian countries during the early 1990s.
6 Petersen and Rajan (2002) document that distance still plays a major role in the provision of credit to small
firms, even though its importance is diminishing with the growth of remote banking facilities.8
fundamental role in supporting and fostering economic growth (King and Levine, 1993;
Guiso et al. 2003a).
Building on a vast theoretical literature, in this paper we argue that owing to
asymmetric information new entrants in credit markets are likely to face a riskier pool of
borrowers than that served by the incumbents. The entrant has a restricted choice in terms of
risk-return combinations when assembling its loan portfolio and is therefore at a
disadvantage compared with the incumbent. Furthermore, since credit risk is generally
endogenous with respect to loan rates because of adverse selection, the entrant may actually
be left with the less profitable segment of the market. As a consequence, asymmetric
information can weaken incentives to entry and shield the incumbents’ profits.
Entry may also occur because there are profitable lines of business other than lending
to be exploited (e.g. payments and other financial services) or because of incumbents’
inefficiency. Nonetheless, entry may generate social costs relating to the special nature of the
banking firms, as long as the additional risks taken by banks entering a credit market raise
their probability of default. Commercial banks’ key role in providing liquid assets to the
economy implies that the social losses associated with their bankruptcy usually exceeds the
private losses of equity holders. Even if entry barriers are not too high to block entry, they
may nevertheless add to systemic risk should some of the entrants default.
We address these issues using data on the Italian local credit markets in the early
1990s. Regulatory reforms introduced in the late 1980s allowed a substantial increase in the
number of banks operating in each local market. The 1992-93 recession caused an
unprecedented surge in non-performing loans, followed by severe losses for a large number
of banks. Thanks to this unique database, we investigate individual banks’ loan default rates
in each local market.
There are two main theoretical arguments supporting the view that asymmetric
information can work as a barrier to entry into credit markets and that incumbents’ market
power can be shielded to some extent from potential competition from outsiders. The first
one, known in the auction theory as the winner’s curse hypothesis, is related to the
possibility that entry enables previously rejected applicants to apply for loans at additional
banks. Insofar as borrowers’ creditworthiness is assessed through screening procedures that9
are not fully revealing and are imperfectly correlated across banks, a larger number of banks
increases the probability that a bad risk will be considered creditworthy by at least one of
them (Broecker, 1990). Adverse selection is greater for new entrants because their pool of
applicants is likely to include would-be borrowers who were previously rejected by mature
banks in the market. To our knowledge, Shaffer (1998), who is very close in spirit to our
paper, has performed  the only study that empirically tests the winner’s curse hypothesis.
The second argument highlights the informational advantages of the incumbents
regarding market-specific characteristics. A substantial amount of the information used by
banks to screen loan applicants and monitor borrowers is generated through repeated
interaction with their customers and the local business community (Dell’Ariccia et al.,
1999). Many theoretical and empirical studies have documented that long-term relationships
between lenders and borrowers are an important feature of most bilateral credit markets (e.g.
Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Boot, 2000). A considerable amount of valuable information can
be acquired only on a market-specific “learning-by-doing” basis; moreover, the threat of
potential competition can increase investments in bank-firm relationships (Yafeh and Yosha,
2001). It follows that incumbents’ creditworthiness tests may well be more accurate than
those of the entrants.
We test these hypotheses by investigating the variance in individual banks’ default
rates. As predicted by theory, we find evidence that, after controlling for the level of
information on local market conditions, entrants are more exposed to bad loans than
incumbents since they have to deal with the backlog of previously rejected applicants.
Subsequently, we distinguish between two different ways in which a bank enters a local
market. The first consists in granting loans from branches or the headquarters outside the
local market. The second is to open a local branch. We argue that the two types of entry
differ substantially in terms of the information gap vis-à-vis incumbents. Having on site-
branches allows banks to monitor borrowers more rigorously and to acquire a deeper
knowledge of the local economy. Moreover, entry with branches is usually anticipated by
entry with outside lending. We find that banks that entered with relatively more information,
i.e. by opening a branch, experienced a lower default rate than those that entered without
branches. There is also a positive relation between the loan default rate and the number of
banks operating in a market, as predicted by the winner’s curse hypothesis. As a general10
result, we find that the sub-optimal effects of entry on loan quality are mitigated when
entrant banks are among the top performers of the industry. Borrowers of banks that are
well-capitalized, efficient and have above-average profits show substantially lower default
rates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we survey some
theoretical and empirical contributions in this field. In Section 3 we illustrate our empirical
specifications, and in Section 4 we discuss our data and explain how the relevant variables
have been constructed. Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 draws the conclusions.
2. Related literature
The possibility that an increase in banking competition may have sub-optimal
allocative effects has long been recognized, but only recently has the argument been cast in
formal models. The backbone of most of these is an application of the theory of common
value first-bid auctions (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). When banks compete in prices (i.e.
interest rates) and have an imperfect knowledge of the would-be borrowers’ ability to repay
their debts, they face an externality caused by the decisions of the other banks.
7 The
screening procedure used by banks may be thought of as a not fully revealing test of the
quality of the applicant. Depending on the result of the test, banks make an interest rate offer
or deny credit. The borrower chooses to sign the credit contract with the bank that offers the
lowest interest rate. If the tests run by different banks are not perfectly correlated, there is a
positive probability that an applicant’s creditworthiness will be assessed differently by
different lenders. This implies that the probability that a high-risk borrower will be found
creditworthy is positively correlated with the number of tests run. It follows that the average
quality of the pool of successful borrowers (and consequently the expected losses from bad
loans) declines (increases) as the number of banks in the market increases (decreases).
This idea was formalized by Broeker (1990) using credit-scoring tests with binary
outcome. Competition is modeled in two different ways −  as a one-stage game and as a two-
stage game −  obtaining different results for the existence and the characterization of the
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between lenders and borrowers about the borrowers’ type is not strictly necessary. The borrower may as well11
equilibrium solutions. In both cases an increase in the number of banks can have negative
effects on the average ability to repay the loan of those who are granted credit. A similar
result was obtained by Riordan (1993) in a model in which banks are able to run
creditworthiness tests delivering continuous signals. An increase in the number of banks
raises the threshold value of the signal above which the loan is granted, but this effect can be
offset by the higher probability that at least one bank will observe a “high-quality” signal
screening a “low-quality” applicant. In Riordan’s model the entry of new banks into a credit
market is associated with a more restrictive supply stance. For a non-trivial set of
parameters, the equilibrium default rate in the market is also positively correlated with the
number of active banks.
As auction theory has long recognized, additional insight may be gained when
information about the value of the object being sold is asymmetrically distributed among
participants (Wilson 1967, 1977). Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) analyze an entry model in which
the incumbent has an informational advantage through a long-term relationship with a
percentage of customers. This advantage is greater the lower is the customer turnover in the
market. They characterize the equilibrium under Bertrand duopoly and show that the adverse
selection of the pool of borrowers blocks entry. Marquez (2002) proposes a two-period
model assuming that borrowers’ characteristics are observable by banks only after a loan has
been granted and that there is some turnover among borrowers. In the second period banks
will refuse to continue financing borrowers shown to be bad. Since information is
proprietary, these borrowers continue to be part of the pool of customers unknown to all the
other banks. In this framework an increase in the number of banks disperses borrower-
specific information, reducing banks’ screening ability. Incumbents’ informational
advantage may also act as a barrier to entry if borrower turnover is low.
  The role of relationship lending in magnifying entrants’ vulnerability has been
extensively studied. Relationship lending generates informational rents accruing to the
banks; “captured” firms can try to escape by looking for better deals in the credit market.
Sharpe (1990) has shown that if an uninformed outsider bank offers a competitive interest
                                                                                                                                            
ignore his/her own type.12
rate (e.g. reflecting the average credit quality), only bad borrowers would prefer to switch.
8
The information asymmetries on the same side of the market (the supply side) created by
relationship lending are therefore most likely to compound the adverse selection problems
faced by a new entrant (Nakamura, 1993). Furthermore, when assessing the creditworthiness
of a loan applicant, banks usually refer to their past experience with similar borrowers in
similar markets. This may imply that when a bank expands in a new market or sector, the
negative effects of a lack of expertise may overcome the benefits from risk diversification
(Winton, 1997).
Compared with the abundance of theoretical papers on the subject, empirical work has
been rather limited. Keeley (1990) finds indirect evidence of increasing credit risk as a
consequence of entry. Analyzing US data from the period 1970-1986, he shows that banks
with more market power have a lower default risk as reflected in lower risk premiums on
large, uninsured CDs. Shaffer (1998) tests empirically the prediction that de novo banks
should suffer higher loan losses due to the adverse selection effect. He considers all US
commercial banks during the period 1986-1995 and regresses the net chargeoff ratio versus
annual age dummies for each of a bank’s first 10 years, controlling for business cycle and
other macroeconomic effects, including quarterly calendar time dummies. He finds that the
net chargeoff rates are strongly and significantly higher from year 3 on. After discussing
alternative explanations of this pattern (such as the seasoning of a new portfolio or learning
by an inexperienced lender), he concludes that adverse selection is the main cause. Shaffer
also estimates a cross-sectional model using data from mature banks, each operating in a
single geographic market (MSA). He finds a strong positive link between gross chargeoff
rates and the total number of banks in each MSA.
On a different ground Hedricks and Porter (1988) investigate the links between the
winner’s curse and asymmetric information among bidders in auctions. They show that in
equilibrium the uninformed buyer makes zero profits, while the informed buyer makes
positive profits thanks to superior information. They also test these theoretical conclusions
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a pure strategy equilibrium in interest rates, which is not true. Nevertheless, informed banks still earn positive
informational rents and so Sharpe’s intuition is correct.13
with data from federal offshore oil and gas drainage lease sales, finding that both types of
buyer actually behave consistently with the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
3. Empirical strategy
The purpose of this paper is to test whether entrants in a local credit market are
systematically subject to higher loan default rates than incumbents. If this is the case, we
argue that it is a consequence of asymmetric information between banks.
The loan default rate is defined as the ratio between new bad loans at time T  and the
stock of performing loans at time T − 1 granted to firms by a bank in a given local market.
Loans are attributed to markets on the basis of customer location. The loan default rate is an
ex-post measure of risk and thus depends on the states of nature that trigger defaults. In
normal times defaults tend to be highly idiosyncratic according to the many characteristics of
the borrowers, so that empirically it can be very difficult to test differences in banks’
choices. We therefore choose to measure default rates in the aftermath of an economic
downturn affecting all borrowers. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events that we try to
capture. Given some initial conditions for banks and local markets, reforms are introduced
lowering the barriers to entry into local markets. This facilitates entry and banks react in
different ways to the new environment. Finally, a strong macroeconomic shock occurs and
the magnitude of risks in banks’ portfolios is revealed.
T0___________________________________T1_______________________________T2
Initial period                                                                                                  Final period
                          Market entry          Macroeconomic shock          Bad loans upsurge
Fig. 1
3.1  The basic econometric model
We model the loan default rate of a bank in a given local market as a function of entry
and information, plus two sets of dummy variables for banks’ and markets’ characteristics.14
We expect entrants to face more severe problems of adverse selection, since they will
receive applications from all the firms that have been previously rejected by the incumbents.
Moreover, the adverse selection effect faced by the incumbents should be inversely
correlated with their knowledge of the local markets. We estimate the following equation by
weighted least squares logit regression for grouped data:
 9
(1) ij j j ij T ij i i T ij P ENTRY SHARE MKT B y ε ϕ γ β α + + + + =
0 2 , , _
where 
2 ,T ij y  is the log-odds transformation of the default rate of bank i’s loans in market  j
at time  2 T . Local market characteristics are accounted for by the dummy Pj, while  i B  is
bank’s  i fixed effect. The variable ENTRYij  is a dummy that assumes a value of 1 when
bank  j  enters market i in the period between  0 T  and  1 T . Entry is defined as the shift from a
market share of zero to a positive one. Finally, we chose the loan market share in the initial
period as a proxy for the amount of information about market characteristics.
10, 11
The comparative disadvantage of entrants should be mitigated by a high turnover of
bank customers. In each period the pool of potential borrowers is composed of the backlog
of those previously rejected and of first-time applicants. The higher is the latter component,
the lower the informational disadvantage of the entrants. We test this hypothesis by
introducing in our regression an interaction variable between the entry dummy and a dummy
identifying high turnover markets:
(2)
ij j j j ij
ij T ij i i T ij
P TURNOVER ENTRY




+ + + =
*
_
0 2 , ,
                                                                       
9 This estimation method is chosen because we are dealing with proportion data, i.e. the fraction of loans in a
local market that defaults in a given time interval. The dependent variable is continuous and ranges from zero
to one. Applying the logistic transformation to the dependent variable allows it to range over all real values (the
logistic transformation of p is given by ln(p/1-p)). Since the variance of the default rate is inversely correlated
with the size of total bank lending in the market under consideration, weighted least square estimation is
needed in order to avoid heteroskedasticity problems.
10 A large market share may also be associated with monopolistic power, which in turn may affect risk-taking.
The exertion of market power, however, depends on the overall market structure, for which we control through
the dummies Pj.
11 The choice of the market share as a proxy for information is justified by the conclusions drawn by Sharpe
(1990), Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) and Marquez (2002).15
we expect a negative coefficient for the interaction variable and a stronger effect of the entry
dummy on the default rate than in equation (1).
3.2  Different definitions of entry and different levels of information
The definition of entry we have used so far is very broad; the acquisition of a positive
market share may be episodic and not necessarily reflect a strategic entry decision. In our
definition the borders of local markets are those of local governments for which a
satisfactory set of statistics exists. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2001) argue that provinces
are also good approximations for local credit markets. On average, 80 per cent of borrowing
by residents in a given province is from bank branches in the same province. Nonetheless,
the proportion of credit granted from outside is not negligible. A natural alternative
definition of entry is the opening of a new branch. When a bank enters a market by opening
a new branch, it presumably has more of information about the local market conditions and
its potential new borrowers than when it enters simply by granting loans from outside. This
difference in knowledge may be due to the fact that the bank already had some customers in
that market or to preliminary market research.
12 Opening a new branch implies sunk costs
that must be justified by the expectation of reaching a critical mass of loans, and these
expectations must be supported by information. Moreover, when a bank opens a new branch
it is likely to provide payment services to its borrowers. Black (1975) and Fama (1985) argue
that this may greatly help banks in their monitoring activity. Mester et al. (2001) provide
empirical evidence that checking account information actually improves monitoring. We
therefore compare the effects on the loan default rate of different types of entry characterized
by different levels of information. Equations (1) and (2) are modified as follows:
(3)
ij j j ij ij
ij T ij i i T ij
P OUTLOANS LOA ENTRY
BR ENTRY SHARE MKT B y
ε ϕ ρ ν
φ β α
+ + + +
+ + + =
_
_ _
0 2 , ,
where  ij BR ENTRY _  indicates if bank i opened a branch in market  j ,  ij LOA ENTRY _
indicates that bank i entered market  j  acquiring at least one new customer but without
                                                                       
12 In our sample 452 out of 493 episodes of entry with branches refer to banks that were already lending in
those markets. Moreover, an ANOVA analysis (not reported) shows that in the year preceding entry banks that
entered with branches had been granting, on average, a larger quantity of loans than those that did not open
branches.16
opening a branch and finally,  ij OUTLOANS  is a dummy that is equal to one if bank i is an
incumbent in market  j  but never opened a branch. We expect all three dummies to have
positive coefficients. In particular, the effect on the default rates should be larger for banks
that entered a market by lending from outside than for those that opened a branch.
Again we test whether high customer turnover mitigates the adverse selection effect by
interacting the entry dummies and  ij OUTLOANS  with the high turnover market indicator. In
what follows we refer to this specification as equation (4).
Theory suggests that we should obtain higher coefficients than those of equation (3)
for the entry dummies and  ij OUTLOANS , while the interaction variables are expected to
have a negative effect on the default rate.
The difference between entry with and without branches suggests a further possible
test. The informational disadvantage of the entrants with branches should be lower if they
were already granting loans in the market they entered. This reduction of the informational
disadvantage should be smaller the larger their market share (our proxy for information)
before entry. By the same token the default rate of the incumbents without branches should
be also lower the larger the market share. We test this hypothesis interacting  ij BR ENTRY _
with the pre-entry market share ( ij SHARE MKT PRE _ _ ) and  ij OUTLOANS  with the initial
period market share.
(5)
ij j t ij ij ij
ij
ij ij ij
T ij i i T ij
P SHARE MKT OUTLOANS OUTLOANS
LOA ENTRY
SHARE MKT PRE BR ENTRY x BR ENTRY
SHARE MKT B y
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Introducing the interactions should reduce the value of the coefficient associated with the
market share and increase that of  ij BR ENTRY _  and  ij OUTLOANS  compared with equation
(3). At the same time the two interactions are expected to have a negative effect on the
default rate.
As a final test we specify a model in which both the turnover and the pre-entry
information effect are present. In what follows we refer to this specification as equation (6).17
3.3  Bank and market characteristics
As an extension of the basic model we replace the banks’ fixed effects and the local
market dummies with appropriate controls in order to have insights on bank and market
characteristics that affect the loan default rate. Moreover, this procedure allows us to test two
additional hypotheses. One, a direct consequence of the independence of the
creditworthiness tests, is that the average quality of loans decreases as the number of banks
in the market increases. The other, related to information, is that high borrower turnover,
though mitigating the relative disadvantage of the entrants, should be positively correlated
with the average default rate as it increases the share of borrowers known only through the
creditworthiness tests. The empirical models have the same structure as those previously
described and in what follows we refer to them as equations (1a), (2a), (3a), (4a), (5a) and
(6a). Their specification can be found in Table VII.
We replace the markets’ fixed effects with two sets of variables, the first intended to
control for the initial conditions at time  0 T , the second to take into account the changes
occurring between time  0 T  and time  1 T . In our specifications we control for the size of the
market and for the level of its overall economic activity through the variables
SIZE MARKET _  and  OUTPUT MARKET _ . The two hypotheses previously described are
tested by introducing the dummy TURNOVER  and the variable  BANKS NUMBER_ ; both
are expected to have a positive coefficient. Market structure is controlled by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman concentration index (HERFINDAHL) computed on loan market shares in the
province. There are several reasons for introducing this variable. First, strong competition
can have a disruptive effect on relationship banking, thereby reducing information
reusability and returns; this diminishes the incentives to gather information and,
consequently, the accurateness of the creditworthiness evaluation (Chan et al., 1986).
Second, the exertion of some market power increases the benefits from providing financial
support to firms in temporary distress (Petersen and Rajan, 1995), making borrowers’ debt
restructuring relatively less costly than default. These two effects should lead to a negative
correlation between market concentration and loan default rates. On the other hand, low
market concentration is frequently associated with low loan interest rates, as has been shown
by many empirical studies (e.g. Berger and Hannan, 1989). According to the Stiglitz-Weiss18
standard result on equilibrium credit rationing, when interest rates are low the pool of
borrowers is likely to include a high proportion of low-risk customers Consequently, market
concentration should be negatively correlated with low default rates
13. A further reason to
control for the level of competition is the use of banks’ market shares as proxies for
information. Finally, as will be discussed later, measures of concentration were employed by
the regulators to set structural controls.
We account for the average quality of the borrowers in the market, as perceived by banks,
by introducing the variable  RATE LOAN _ : high loan interest rates in the initial period
should signal that riskier projects have been financed and they are therefore expected to be
positively correlated with ex-post default rates. In Italy court proceedings take a long time to
produce an outcome (Generale and Gobbi, 1996; Bianco et al., 2001). Differences in court
efficiency in enforcing bankruptcy procedures may be reflected in opportunistic behaviour
on the part of borrowers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Therefore, we include the variable
BANKRUPTCY  indicating the average number of days needed to complete bankruptcy
proceedings; the expected sign of its coefficient is positive. The changes in market
conditions between  0 T  and  1 T  are described by the variables  L DHERFINDAH  and
RATE DLOAN _ . Finally, we control for the effect of the economic downturn with the
variable  SHOCK OUTPUT _ .
Regarding banks’ characteristics, we control for size, efficiency and leverage. A bad
management may have poor skills in credit scoring, be unable to appraise the value of
collateral and have difficulty in monitoring. Banks that had a high proportion of bad loans in
the initial period ( BADL BANK _ ) are also likely to have a high default rate in later periods.
Overall efficiency is proxied by gross returns on equity ( PROFIT BANK _ ) and it is
expected to have a negative coefficient. The loan default rate may also be affected by banks’
moral hazard. Banks with low returns may be tempted to gamble, assuming too much risk in
order to remain in the market. This temptation is stronger the greater the leverage, due to the
effect of deposit insurance and limited liability (Brander and Lewis, 1986; Dewatripont and
Tirole, 1994). The variable  CAPITAL BANK _ , defined as the ratio of equity capital to total
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assets, is expected to have a negative coefficient. The changes occurring between time  0 T
and time  1 T  are captured by the two variables  CAPITAL DBANK _  and
PROFIT DBANK _ . An increase in leverage should be positively linked to the default rate,
owing to the regulator’s intervention. The expected sign of the coefficient associated with
PROFIT DBANK _  is less straightforward. An increase in bank profits may have two
interpretations. On one hand, banks’ overall efficiency may have improved during the period
under consideration, and this would imply a negative coefficient associated with the variable
PROFIT DBANK _ . On the other hand, short-sighted managers may deliberately choose to
skimp on the resources devoted to creditworthiness evaluation in order to obtain high short-
run returns at the price of larger loan losses in the future (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). In
this case the coefficient should be positive. We also include a set of dummy variables
indicating the institutional status of the bank (i.e. thrift institutions, special credit institutions,
cooperative banks or community banks). We expect the coefficients of the dummies
associated with cooperative and community banks to be negative, because of the high level
of information that these institutions have about their customers, as documented by previous
studies (e.g. Angelini et. al., 1998).
14
3.4  Consequences on incumbents' loan default rates
A natural extension of the analysis is to assess the consequences of entry on
incumbents' default rates. Theory suggests two effects working in opposite directions. The
first one is related to incumbents' customers. According to Sharpe (1990), uninformed
entrants offer an interest rate that reflects the average credit quality of borrowers in the
market. In so doing they attract incumbents' high-risks customers who are charged high
interest rates (Sharpe effect). This implies a negative relation between the number of entrants
in a given market and incumbents' default rate. The second effect is related to the first-time
loan applicants. Broeker (1990) and Shaffer (1998) predict that entry, by increasing the
number of banks, increases the probability that a bad borrower will be found creditworthy by
at least one of them (Shaffer effect). Therefore, a large number of entrants should be
                                                                       
14 Both cooperative and community banks (respectively banche popolari and banche di credito cooperativo)
are actually cooperative institutions, the latter being more strictly tied to relatively small local communities and
subject to specific regulation.20
correlated with higher default rates for incumbents. In order to test which of these two
effects prevails, we estimate the following equation:
(7) 
ij
j j j j
ij T ij i i T ij
CONTROLS MARKET
TURNOVER ENTRANTS N TURNOVER ENTRANTS N





+ + + +
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where 
2 ,T ij y  is the log-odds transformation of the default rate of incumbent bank i’s loans in
market  j  at time  2 T ;  j ENTRANTS N _  is the number of entrants in market j in the period
between  0 T  and  1 T  and MARKET _CONTROLS is a set of covariates including market size,
the number of existing banks, the Herfindahl index, the average loan rate, the average
number of days needed to complete a bankruptcy procedure, the level of economic activity
and the output shock. Depending on which of the two effects prevails the variable
j ENTRANTS N _  will have a positive or negative coefficient. Whichever is the prevailing
effect, incumbents in markets characterized by a high level of turnover should exhibit higher
default rates, since in every period there is a larger proportion of borrowers whose risk level
can be assessed through the creditworthiness test only. Actually, the Shaffer effect only
works on new customers, so that introducing an interaction between the number of entrants
and turnover allows us to disentangle the two effects. In order to check for robustness of
these specifications, we also estimate the same models considering entry with branches and
entry with loans.
4. Data
We use data referring to the Italian banking industry for the period from 1986 to 1996
and define local markets as provinces.
15 Beginning in the 1980s the Italian banking system
underwent a series of reforms aimed at increasing competition in the market. From 1985 to
1991 the Italian economy enjoyed a period of growth, which ended in 1992 with the deepest
recession of the post-war period (see Chart 1).
                                                                       
15 Italy is divided into 103 provinces, which correspond by and large to US counties. However, since 821
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Loan default rate (1) GDP growth rate (2)
Sources: Bank of Italy (Central Credit Register and Supervisory Reports) and Istat (National Accounts).
(1) New bad loans as a percentage of the stock of performing loans outstanding at the end of the preceding year: annual data.– (2)
Percentage change at constant prices with respect to the corresponding quarter of the preceding year.
In particular, the Italian Credit Authorities increasingly liberalized branching and eased
the geographical restrictions on lending, thereby lowering the barriers to entry into the local
markets. From the late 1970s the opening of new bank branches had been regulated by the
"branch distribution plans" issued every four years. Structural control on entry into local
credit markets was deemed necessary on the grounds, widely shared by regulators in those
years, that market forces alone could not deliver both efficiency and stability. Among the
objectives of branch distribution plans was that of "seeking a more homogenous level of
competition in the various areas" (Lanciotti, 1984, p. 229), and measures of market
concentration were used to gauge rivalry among banks.
The last distribution plan was issued in 1986; from March 1990 the establishment of
new branches was completely liberalized. This led to unprecedented growth in the number of
branches: from 13,136 in 1985 to 19,786 in 1992. The phenomenon was nationwide: the
province with the largest number of branches went from 891 in 1985 to 1,512 in 1992, the
                                                                                                                                            
provinces were carved out in 1995, in our sample period we have only 95 local markets.22
one with the smallest from 13 to 21. Along with the number of branches, the credit-to-GDP
ratio also rose significantly in the same period. The GDP growth started to slacken at the end
of 1991 and bottomed out during the first quarter of 1993. The long and severe recession
proved to be a hard test for loans granted in the previous years; the default rate rose to 4.2
per cent, depressing banks' returns for several years.
We draw our data from four sources. The default rate and the local market credit
variables are from the Italian Central Credit Register (CCR).
16 Banks’ characteristics are
from the Supervisory Reports to the Bank of Italy, which collects data about banks’ balance
sheets and income statements. GDP by province comes from the data constructed by the
Istituto Tagliacarne, a research unit of the Italian Chambers of Commerce, while the length
of court bankruptcy proceedings is drawn from the Court Statistics compiled by Istat, Italy’s
National Institute for Statistics. The Italian Central Credit Register (CCR) is a department of
the Bank of Italy that collects data on borrowers from their lending banks. The reporting
banks file detailed information for each borrower with total loans and credit lines above
75,000 euros. Banks are requested to report smaller exposures only in the case of the
borrower’s default. Bad loans are defined on a customer basis and therefore include all the
outstanding credit to borrowers considered insolvent.
For bad loans we use the “adjusted” statistics provided by the CCR. In the case of a
single bank relationship the “adjusted” definition coincides with bad loans, namely all the
loans extended to insolvent borrowers. Loans extended to borrowers with multiple bank
relationships are all classified among the “adjusted” bad loans when: i) the borrower is
reported as insolvent by a bank which accounts for 70 per cent or more of the exposure to the
banking system; ii) the borrower is reported as insolvent by two or more banks which
account for at least 10 per cent of the total exposure to the banking system.
Our sample has 7,275 observations referring to 729 banks, representing virtually all
commercial banks for which data were available during the period under consideration.
Mergers and acquisitions that took place between 1986 and 1996 were considered as if they
occurred in 1986. This implies that entry by M&A is not considered in our analysis; a bank
                                                                       
16A description of the Italian CCR is contained in Miller (2000).23
entering a new market by M&A does not increase the number of banks in that market and
inherits the information held by the acquired bank.
The sets of dummy variables that we use in our specifications lead to two partitions of
our sample based on the banks' status of incumbent or entrant. Table I describes these
partitions. Panel A is based on the dummies used in equations (1) to (6), where entry is
defined as passing from a market share equal to zero to a positive one. By contrast, the
partition in Panel B is based on the set of dummy variables used in equations (7) to (12), in
which we distinguish between entry with and without branches.
Table II shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and the independent
variables. We constructed our dependent variable, the default rate, as an average from 1993
to 1996 of the ratios between new bad loans at time T  to performing loans at time T − 1.
Italian regulations allow banks a large degree of discretion in judging whether a loan is bad
or performing. The “adjusted” statistics on bad loans remove differences in banks’ loan
classification for multiple-bank borrowers. To cope with single-bank borrowers we chose to
take the average ratio over several years. The initial period (1993) is the year of the business
cycle trough which was followed by a short recovery and a further slowdown. The final
period (1996) marks the beginning of a steady recovery. In computing the default rate we
used data on non-financial firms with bank debt ranging from 130,000 to 26,000,000 euros.
Data below this range are rather noisy because of the distortion introduced by the CCR
reporting threshold, while those above it refer to loans granted to large firms, which are
usually managed by banks’ headquarters rather than by local branches. The average ratio
was appropriately adjusted to compute its log-odds ratio.
17
The variable MARKET_SHARE, intended to capture the level of information about
market economic conditions, is the market share of loans by bank and province. The
information acquired before opening a branch in a new market is proxied by the variable
PRE_MK_SHARE, which is constructed as the market share of entrants with branches the
year before entry.
                                                                       
17 The default rate is p=z/k, where z are the new bad loans and k the stock of performing loans the year before.
The correction sets z’=0.001*k whenever z=0 and k’=k+0.001*z whenever k=z.24
All the initial conditions for bank and market characteristics refer to 1986, when the
last “branch distribution plan” was issued. TURNOVER is a dummy variable that has a
value of one if the customer turnover in a market (computed as the ratio between new
customers in 1986 to existing customers in 1985) exceeds the 75
th percentile of the
distribution of turnover over markets. The variable MARKET_SIZE is the log of the
province’s population, NUMBER_BANKS is the log of the number of banks operating in
that market. Concentration is measured by the variable HERFINDAHL, which is the
Herfindahl index computed on loans, based on the location of the borrower; LOAN_RATE,
which measures the risk of the financed projects as perceived by banks, is the average
interest rate on loans. The intensity of economic activity is measured by per capita value
added (MARKET_OUTPUT). DHERFINDAHL and DLOAN_RATE are the differences of
HERFINDAHL and LOAN_RATES respectively in 1991 (the last year before the recession)
and 1986. The macroeconomic shock is captured by the variable OUTPUT_SHOCK, the rate
of growth of value added in real terms in 1993, the year in which the recession reached its
trough. A slightly different approach was used to construct BANKRUPTCY. This variable is
the log of the average number of days needed to complete bankruptcy proceedings during the
period 1983-86.
The variable BANK_SIZE is constructed as the log of total assets; BANK_CAPITAL
is the ratio of capital to total assets. BANK_BADL is the ratio between the stock of bad
loans and the stock of performing loans. BANK_PROFITS is measured by returns on equity
before taxes. The variables accounting for changes in bank’s characteristics,
DBANK_CAPITAL and DBANK_PROFITS, are computed as the differences between the
respective variables in 1991 and 1986. COMMUNITY, COOPERATIVE, SCI and THRIFT
are dummy variables indicating whether the bank was, respectively, a cooperative bank, a
community bank, a special credit institution or thrift institution.
The variable N_ENTRANTS is the log of one plus the number of entrants during the
interval 1986-1991 in a given market. N_ENTRANTS_LOA and N_ENTRANTS_BR are
the log of one plus the number of banks that entered a given market with loans and with
branches respectively.25
5. Results
We estimated equations (1) to (10) using weighted least squares logit regression for
grouped data. Estimation results for the fixed effects model are shown in Table III. The first
two columns report the estimated coefficients of the equations in which entry is defined as
the acquisition of a positive market share during the period 1986-1991. The remaining
columns show the estimation results for the equations in which we distinguished between
entrants and incumbents with and without branches. The overall pattern of the coefficients is
consistent across the different specifications.
Our hypothesis on the consequences of entry is confirmed by the data: the entry
dummies are positive and strongly significant under both the definitions adopted. The
coefficient associated with the market share is negative and significantly different from zero:
the greater the information about the local market conditions and the pool of customers, the
lower the default rate. The positive coefficient associated with OUTLOANS  implies that
granting loans from outside, i.e. with a small informational endowment, leads to high default
rates. Moreover, the introduction of the interactions of the entry dummies with the market
share, the pre-entry market share and customer turnover has the expected negative effects,
confirming that the informational disadvantage is greater for complete newcomers and that
the adverse selection they face is less where the turnover of customers is high.
As is well known, in a logit regression for grouped data it is not possible to interpret
the regression coefficients as the partial derivatives of the conditional expectation of the
default rate with respect to the associated independent variables. In order to assess the
economic significance of the coefficients, we estimate the predicted loan default rates for
different values of the relevant independent variables using Duan’s (1983) smearing
estimator.
The smearing estimate of the expected default rate evaluated at k is:
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i.e. the inverse of the log-odds transformation,  k x  is the vector of the control variables
evaluated at k and  WLS β ˆ  the vector of the estimated coefficients of the log-odds model.
Following Manning (1998) the residuals are obtained as:
(10) WLS i i i x y β ε ˆ ˆ
' − =
where  i y  is the  th i −  observation of the dependent variable and  i x  the vector of the
regressors relative to the  th i −  observation.
Table IV reports the predicted default rates based on the regression coefficients of
equations (1) and (3) (Panels A and B, respectively). Panel A shows that loans granted by
banks that enter a new market (here entry is defined as the acquisition of a positive market
share) end up as bad debts with a 7.44 per cent probability, almost twice as high as loans
granted by incumbents that had a large market share (i.e. equal to the 90
th percentile of the
distribution of MARKET_SHARE for the incumbents) in the initial period (3.08 per cent).
Incumbents with a small market share (i.e. equal to the 10
th percentile) experience a default
rate lying between the two extremes, though closer to the lower one (3.59 per cent) and still
below the sample mean. The difference in the predicted probabilities between the two types
of incumbents can be explained by the different endowments of information. The entrants,
on the other hand, not only have scarce information about the local market conditions, but
they are also more exposed than incumbents to adverse selection.
The results reported in Panel B distinguish between banks that enter a new market by
opening a branch (possibly already having some customers there) and those that enter by
granting loans. The different categories of banks are ranked in ascending order with respect
to the predicted default rate of their loan portfolio. This ranking would be exactly the same if
we ordered them according to the amount of information they presumably have about the
local market conditions and their borrowers or the possibility they have to monitor borrowers
closely. Incumbent banks with a large market share and with branches are best placed to
assess the impact of the business cycle on the local economy, to evaluate the
creditworthiness of their borrowers and to monitor them once the loan is granted. Their27
predicted default rate, equal to 2.00 per cent, is far below the sample mean. This
informational advantage declines if the market share is small and becomes even less if a
bank is new in that market: entrants with branches experience a default rate 0.9 percentage
points (or 45 per cent) higher than incumbents with branches and a large market share.
Having a branch on site seems to be very important in order to avoid credit losses.
According to our estimates, even incumbent banks with a relatively large market share, but
not present with a branch, are likely to have high default rates (4.40 per cent), more than
twice as high as that of incumbents with a large market share and branches. An explanation
is that better screening and monitoring abilities are associated with the presence of a
branch.
18 Also, opening a branch implies some sunk costs and that requires a careful ex ante
assessment of the profitability and the risk of the operation. It is therefore reasonable to
suppose that banks that decide to open a branch are already quite well informed about the
market conditions and the potential risks linked with the winner’s curse. If a potential
borrower applies for a loan in a bank that is relatively far from his location, it is reasonable
to suppose that his application was previously rejected by some, if not all, the banks that
have branches in his province. The winner’s curse is therefore far stronger for those that
grant loans from outside. This, plus the scarce information about local market conditions,
explains the extremely high default rate (7.78 per cent) on the loan portfolio of those banks
that enter without opening a branch.
Table V reports the predicted default rates obtained using the regression coefficients of
equation (4) and highlights the role of information in reducing the loan default rate. Entrants
with branches and with a small pre-entry market share experience loan loss rates 6 per cent
higher than those with a large pre-entry market share. The difference between incumbents
without branches with large and small market share is larger (10 per cent).
Table VI shows the effect of high customer turnover. Panel A reports the predicted
default rates based on the regression coefficients of equation (5). Low customer turnover
increases the default rate of entrants by 30 per cent. In Panel B, the predicted default rates
are based on the regression coefficients of equation (6). Entrants with branches in high
                                                                       
18 The presence of a branch is almost a necessary condition for the bank to supply payment services to
borrowers in a local market. As shown by Mester et al. (2001) the information gathered through checking
accounts makes banks more effective in their monitoring activity.28
turnover markets have a default rate 11 per cent lower than their peers in high turnover
markets. Entrants without branches reduce their loan default rate by 51 per cent if they enter
a high turnover market instead of a low turnover one. This confirms that entrants without
branches are much more exposed to adverse selection and informational disadvantage than
entrants with branches.
We show the estimation results for the covariate model in Table VII, organized in the
same way as Table III. Replacing market and bank fixed effects with the covariates does not
alter the sign and the significance of the entry dummies and their interactions with market
share, pre-entry market share and customer turnover. Again, the overall pattern of
coefficients is consistent across the different specifications. The data support our hypotheses
regarding the effects of the number of banks operating in a market and the existence of a
high customer turnover: both NUMBER_BANKS and TURNOVER have a positive and
significant coefficient. Banks operating in markets characterized by a large number of banks
experience higher default rates, as predicted by the theory; high customer turnover increases
loan losses because it increases in the share of borrowers known only through the
creditworthiness tests. HERFINDAHL has a positive sign which is at odds with most of the
theoretical predictions (e.g. Chan et al., 1986) and previous empirical evidence (Keeley,
1990).
19 There are several possible interpretations. One is that previous regulations on
branching tended to shelter more fragile markets from competition. Another is that the
inefficiencies associated with a lack of competition reverberate on the screening procedures
(Guiso et al., 2003b). Finally, highly concentrated markets, other things being equal, are
likely to experience high interest rates, therefore attracting high risk borrowers (Boyd and De
Nicolò, 2002).
All the remaining coefficients on market covariates have the expected signs. The
hypotheses regarding banks characteristics are also confirmed. Banks with high leverage,
incapable managers and low efficiency experience significantly higher default rates, as
confirmed by the signs associated with the variables BANK_CAPITAL, BANK_BADL and
BANK_PROFITS. The negative coefficient associated with the variable DBANK_PROFITS
                                                                       
19 Since we are aware of the potential problems due to multicollinearity with other variables we have estimated
equations  1a to 6a without the variable HERFINDAHL, with no qualitative change and a slight inflation in the
standard errors of some coefficients.29
suggests rejecting the skimping hypothesis and accepting the idea of an improvement in
banks’ overall efficiency.
Applying the same methodology previously described, we assess the economic
significance of the estimates by computing the predicted default rates for different values of
the entry dummies, information and banks’ and markets’ covariates. The results in Table VII
are computed using the regression coefficients of equation (1a). The top line of the table
shows the predicted default rate for the three types of banks identified in this specification,
keeping all the other covariates at their mean values
20. The rest of the table reports the
predicted default rates obtained by setting one regressor at the 25
th (75
th) percentile, while
keeping all the others at the mean. Tables IX and X are similarly organized and report the
predicted default rates for banks lending in local markets with and without branches,
respectively; the regression coefficients used for the calculations are those of equation (3a).
The values obtained keeping all the covariates at their mean are consistent with those
reported in Tables IV and V. Banks lending in markets with a large number of banks
experience a default rate up to 18 per cent higher than if they lent in markets with a small
number of banks. Efficiency and managers’ ability play a crucial role in determining the loan
default rate of banks. Overall, ex-ante efficiency reduces the predicted default rate by almost
19 per cent. As could be expected, specific abilities in assessing creditworthiness and
monitoring also have a significant impact. The predicted default rate is 15 per cent  higher if
computed at the 25
th or 75
th percentile of BANK_BADL. Finally, the strong local roots of
cooperative and community banks generate relationship information of which lenders seem
to take advantage in their screening and monitoring activities. The finding that these
intermediaries experience lower than average loan default rates is consistent with other
empirical studies performed using different samples and different methodologies (e.g.
Cannari and Signorini, 1997).
Table XI reports the results of the analysis of the effects of entry on incumbents’
default rate. The first two columns show the regression coefficients of the estimate of
equation (7), with and without the interaction between the number of entrants and turnover.
The negative coefficient of the variable N_ENTRANTS indicates that the Sharpe effect is
stronger than the Shaffer effect: the improvement in incumbents’ default rates deriving from30
the fact that their riskier customers switch to the entrants more than compensates for the
worsening of their loan quality due to the higher probability they have of assessing a high-
risk new customer creditworthy. The second column of the table shows, however, that the
Shaffer effect does exist and is significant. The coefficient of the interaction between the
number of entrants and customer turnover is positive, while the absolute value of the
coefficient of N_ENTRANTS increases. This is consistent with the hypothesis that, as far as
first-time loan applicants are concerned, an increase in the number of banks in the markets
causes incumbents’ default rate to rise. Finally, this further specification can also be
interpreted as a robustness check of the result that reduced distance between banks and their
customers helps to keep the default rates low and that more information reduces the risk
level of banks’ loan portfolios. Both the coefficients of OUTLOANS and of MKT_SHARE
are significant and with the same sign obtained in the previous specifications.
6. Conclusions
This paper has explored the links between entry and default rates of loans granted by
the entrants. Using the coefficients of a log-odds regression for grouped data, we estimated
the loan default rates for different definitions of entry and for different levels of information
about the local market economic conditions. We found significantly higher default rates for
banks that enter local markets than for the incumbents. The default rate is higher for banks
that enter without opening a branch, suggesting that having a branch on site can help to
reduce the informational disadvantage. Our results confirm the insights provided by
theoretical models which emphasize the role of asymmetric information in determining
incentives and costs of entry into credit markets.
We believe that our empirical results can have implications for several issues
investigated in the banking literature as well as for policy-making. We discuss two of them:
the welfare effects of a rise in bank competition and the importance of the distance between
lenders and borrowers for market integration.
                                                                                                                                            
20 Mean values and percentiles refer to the distributions by banks and by provinces.31
According to our estimates, entry into credit markets can generate substantial costs in
term of loan losses and therefore the number of entrants into local credit markets may be too
low. Combined with the well-established negative correlation between the measure of
market competition and loan interest rates (Berger and Hannan, 1989; Berger and Hannan,
1998) our results suggest that market free entry may not sweep away all of the monopolistic
rents earned by the incumbents. Endogenous barriers to entry are likely to be particularly
high in two circumstances. The first is that in which lending and other activities based on the
acquisition of proprietary information generate a high proportion of bank revenues. Banks
are multi-output financial firms and for some of these outputs the importance of asymmetric
information is of second order with the respect to the supply of loans. For instance, Hannan
and Prager (1998) find evidence that in the US the liberalization of state laws restricting
inter-state multi-bank holding company operations caused an increase in deposit interest
rates. After the repeal of this legislation banks entering local markets to pursue profits in the
deposit markets may also have exerted competitive pressures on the local loan markets.
More generally, the ongoing trend of the last decade towards a larger share of service-based
revenues by the banking industries in a large number of countries (OECD, 2003) may have
substantially reduced the importance of barriers to entry related to loan markets. The other
circumstance in which endogenous barriers to entry may be particularly severe is for
relationship lending, i.e. for loans to small and innovative firms. Other empirical studies
have emphasized the sensitivity of relationship lending to competition (e.g. Petersen and
Rajan, 1995) because of the long term commitments required by strong bilateral
relationships, which lead to very illiquid financial assets. Again, developments in the
financial industries bringing new contracts and new intermediaries such as those associated
with venture capital are likely to reduce the role of close bank-firm relationships and
therefore of asymmetries among lenders (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).
 The second issue we intend to dwell on is the role of distance. One of our key findings
is that banks lending in markets in which they have branches experience far lower loan
default rates than banks lending from a distance. The importance of distance in banking has
been recently emphasized by a number of papers discussing the impact of technical progress
in financial intermediation. Petersen and Rajan (2002) find evidence that in the United States
the distance at which banks lend has increased substantially during the last decade. However32
they also find that informationally opaque firms have closer lenders. Berger et al. (2002)
show that large banks, which lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their
borrowers and have shorter relationships. In credit markets, where incomplete contracting is
widespread, physical proximity is likely to reduce the information gap between lenders and
borrowers. Geographical market segmentation is therefore likely to be a persistent
characteristic for a significant proportion of borrowers, despite the development of remote
banking facilities.Tables
Table I
ENTRY INTO LOCAL MARKETS IN THE 1986-1991 PERIOD
The table reports the partition of our sample determined by the two different definitions of entry used. Panel A
displays the number of observations referring to incumbents and entrants, in which entry is defined as passing
from a zero to a positive market share during the sampling period. Panel B distinguishes between incumbents and
entrants with and without branches. Note that the number of incumbents in Panel A is not the sum of the two
types of incumbents in Panel B because 452 banks that entered with a branch, but were already granting loans,
must be added. Similarly, the number of entrants displayed in Panel A is the number of entrants without branches
reported in Panel B plus 41 banks that entered a local market in which they were not previously granting loans.
Panel A
Partition determined by the dummies used in equation (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6)





Partition determined by the dummies used in equation (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12)
ENTRY_BR ENTRY_LOA OUTLOANS Description No. Obs.
0 0 0 Incumbents with branches 1,852
0 0 1 Incumbents without branches 3,392
1 0 0 Entrants with branches 493
0 1 0 Entrants without branches 1,538
Total 7,275Table II
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The table displays the descriptive statistics for the dependent and the independent variables. The database has
7,275 observations, referring to 729 banks and 95 local markets. The (0,1) notation indicates a dummy variable.
The dependent variable, DEF_RATE, is the default rate of loans granted to firms and is obtained as an average
from 1993 to 1996 of the ratio between new bad loans at time T and performing loans at time T-1. The original
default rate was corrected in order to compute its log-odds ratio. The correction was made as follows: denoting
the default rate as p=z/k, where z is the new bad loans and k the stock of performing loans the year before, we set
z’=0.001*k whenever z=0 and k’=k+0.001*z whenever k=z. All the explanatory variables refer to 1986, except
when differently specified. MKT_SHARE is the market share of loans by bank and market; PRE_MK_SHARE is
the market share of the entrants with branches the year before entry. The following dummy variables are the
indicators for entry and refer to the period 1986-1991: ENTRY indicates if a bank passed from a zero to a positive
market share in a given market; ENTRY_BR assumes value one if a bank opened a branch in a market;
ENTRY_LOA indicates whether a bank passed from a zero to a positive market share in a given market without
opening a branch; OUTLOANS assumes value one if a bank was an incumbent in a market, but did not have a
branch. TOURNOVER is a dummy variable that assumes value one if the customer turnover in a market
(computed as the ratio between new clients in 1986 and existing clients in 1985) exceeds the 75
th percentile of the
distribution of turnover over markets. The variable MARKET_SIZE is the log of the province’s population,
NUMBER_BANKS is the log of the number of banks in each market. HERFINDAHL is the Herfindahl index
computed on loans, based on the location of the borrower; LOAN_RATE is the average interest rate on loans.
BANKRUPTCY is the log of the average number of days needed to complete  bankruptcy proceedings during the
period 1983-85. MARKET_OUTPUT is the log of per capita value added. DHERFINDAHL and DLOAN_RATE
are the differences of HERFINDAHL and LOAN_RATES respectively in 1991 and 1986. OUTPUT_SHOCK is
computed as the growth rate of value added in real terms in 1993. The variable BANK_SIZE is constructed as the
log of total assets; BANK_CAPITAL is the ratio of capital to total assets. BANK_BADL is the ratio between the
stock of bad loans and the stock of performing loans. BANK_PROFIT is measured by returns on equity before
taxes. DBANK_CAPITAL and DBANK_PROFITS are constructed as the differences between the respective
variables in 1991 and 1986. COMMUNITY, COOPERATIVE, SCI and THRIFT are dummy variables indicating
whether the bank is, respectively, a cooperative bank, a community bank, a special credit institution or thrift
institution.
Symbol Mean Min. Max. St. Dev.
Dependent Variable
DEF_RATE 0.048 0.001 0.999 0.106
Explanatory Variables
            Bank - market variables
MKT_SHARE 0.012 0.000 0.461 0.034
PRE_MKT_SHARE 0.001 0.000 0.223 0.005
ENTRY (0,1) 0.217 0.000 1.000 0.412
ENTRY_BR (0,1) 0.068 0.000 1.000 0.251
ENTRY_LOA (0,1) 0.211 0.000 1.000 0.408
OUTLOANS (0,1) 0.466 0.000 1.000 0.499Table II – Continued
Market variables
TURNOVER (0,1) 0.292 0.000 1.000 0.455
MARKET_SIZE 13.228 11.433 15.191 0.829
NUMBER_BANKS 4.851 3.296 5.979 0.546
HERFINDAHL 0.083 0.029 0.261 0.042
LOAN_RATE 14.823 12.660 17.960 1.311
BANKRUPTCY 7.652 7.389 8.125 0.177
MARKET_OUTPUT 3.313 1.369 5.122 0.527
DHERFINDAHL -0.006 -0.122 0.051 0.019
DLOAN_RATE -0.041 -2.690 1.530 0.764
OUTPUT_SHOCK -1.580 -4.920 1.737 1.401
Bank variables
BANK_SIZE 7.798 1.692 11.275 2.050
BANK_CAPITAL 0.059 0.005 0.204 0.033
BANK_BADL 0.063 0.000 0.472 0.034
BANK_PROFIT 0.262 0.012 2.979 0.156
DBANK_CAPITAL 0.014 -0.111 0.230 0.028
DBANK_PROFIT -0.092 -2.876 1.704 0.165
COOPERATIVE (0,1) 0.197 0.000 1.000 0.397
COMMUNITY (0,1) 0.126 0.000 1.000 0.332
SCI (0,1) 0.195 0.000 1.000 0.397
THRIFT (0,1) 0.204 0.000 1.000 0.403Table III
DETERMINANTS OF THE LOAN DEFAULT RATE:
THE FIXED EFFECT MODEL
The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, for the
fixed effect model. The regressions are estimated with weighted least square logit for grouped data. The (0,1)
notation indicates a dummy variable. Dummy variables for banks and markets are not reported. The dependent
variable is the log-odds ratio of the loan default rate. The first two columns report the estimated coefficients of
the equations where entry is defined as the acquisition of a positive market share during the period 1986-1991.
The second column adds to the basic model the interaction between entry and customer turnover. Columns
from three to six distinguish between entrants and incumbents with and without branches. The fourth column
extends the basic model introducing two interactions: one between the entry dummy and the pre-entry market
share (for those entering with branches), the other between the dummy for being an incumbent without
branches and the market share. Column five introduces customer turnover, while the last column shows the
effects of both market share and turnover.
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CONSTANT -3.057 *** -3.056 *** -3.097 *** -3.115 *** -3.085 *** -3.098 ***
0.049 0.049 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046
MKT_SHARE -3.421 *** -3.420 *** -2.377 *** -2.159 *** -2.374 *** -2.138 ***
0.120 0.120 0.125 0.126 0.125 0.126
ENTRY (0,1) 0.964 *** 1.086 ***
0.081 0.098
ENTRY * TURNOVER (0,1) -0.355 ***
0.162
ENTRY * MKT_SHARE
ENTRY_BR (0,1) 0.187 *** 0.289 *** 0.238 *** 0.362 ***
0.032 0.036 0.040 0.045
ENTRY_BR * TURNOVER (0,1) -0.127 ** -0.163 ***
0.061 0.061
ENTRY_BR * PRE_MKT_SHARE -3.820 *** -4.050 ***
0.760 0.767
ENTRY_LOA (0,1) 1.392 *** 1.392 *** 1.589 *** 1.588 ***
0.083 0.082 0.101 0.100
ENTRY_LOA*TURNOVER (0,1) -0.551 *** -0.546 ***
0.162 0.161
OUTLOANS (0,1) 0.687 *** 0.775 *** 0.732 *** 0.863 ***
0.027 0.029 0.032 0.035
OUTLOANS * TURNOVER (0,1) -0.100 ** -0.185 ***
0.042 0.043
OUTLOANS * MKT_SHARE -5.331 *** -5.771 ***
0.573 0.584
Adj. R-squared 0.623 0.624 0.659 0.664 0.659 0.666
N. of observations 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275
N. of local markets 95 95 95 95 95 95
N. of banks 729 729 729 729 729 729
*** , ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test against a null
of  0.0.Table IV
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE:
THE EFFECT OF ENTRY IN THE FIXED EFFECT MODEL
The table reports the smearing estimates (Duan, 1983) of the effect of entry on the loan default rate. We obtain
the predicted default rates shown in Panel A as follows. Using the coefficients reported in the first column of
Table III, we compute the regression residuals as the difference between the dependent variable and the linear
predictions (Manning, 1998). Then we compute the predicted values for each observation by adding to the
residuals the product of the vector of the regression coefficients times the vector of the covariates evaluated at the
mean value, except for the variables of interest. That is, we set MARKET_SHARE=90
th  percentile of the
distribution of MARKET_SHARE for the incumbents and ENTRY=0, if computing the default rate of the
incumbents with a large market share; MARKET_SHARE=10
th  percentile and ENTRY=0, if computing the
default rate of the incumbents with a small market share; MARKET_SHARE=0 and ENTRY=1, if computing the
default rate of entrants. Then we take the average and finally we apply the inverse of the log-odds transformation,
obtaining the predicted default rate. The results shown in Panel B are obtained using the regression coefficients
reported in the third column of Table III.
Panel A
Predicted default rate
Incumbents with a large market share 3.08




Incumbents with a large market share and with branches 2.00
Incumbents with a small market share and with branches 2.58
Entrants with branches 2.90
Incumbents with a large market share and without branches 4.40
Incumbents with a small market share and without branches 4.53
Entrants without branches 7.78Table V
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE:
THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION IN THE FIXED EFFECT MODEL
The table reports the smearing estimates of the effect of information on the loan default rate based on the
regression coefficients shown in the fourth column of Table III. The computation technique is the same used in
Table IV.
Predicted default rate
Incumbents with a large market share and with branches 1.99
Incumbents with a small market share and with branches 2.51
Entrants with branches and with a large pre-entry market share 2.91
Entrants with branches and with a small pre-entry market share 3.09
Incumbents without branches and with a large market share 4.31
Incumbents without branches and with a small market share 4.73
Entrants without branches 7.60Table VI
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE:
THE EFFECT OF TURNOVER IN THE FIXED EFFECT MODEL
The table reports the smearing estimates of the effect of customer turnover on the loan default rate based on the




Entrants in high turnover markets 6.28
Entrants in low turnover markets 8.13
Panel B
Predicted default rate
Entrants with branches in high turnover markets 2.83
Entrants with branches in low turnover markets 3.14
Incumbents without branches in high turnover markets 4.26
Incumbents without branches in low turnover markets 4.61
Entrants without branches in high turnover markets 5.92
Entrants without branches in low turnover markets 8.95Table VII
DETERMINANTS OF THE LOAN DEFAULT RATE:
THE COVARIATE MODEL
The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, for the
covariate model. The regressions are estimated with weighted least square logit for grouped data. The (0,1)
notation indicates a dummy variable. Dummy variables for thrift and special credit institutions are not reported.
The dependent variable is the log-odds ratio of the loan default rate. The first two columns report the estimated
coefficients of the equations where entry is defined as the acquisition of a positive market share during the period
1986-1991. The second column adds to the basic model customer turnover. Columns from three to six distinguish
between entrants and incumbents with and without branches. The fourth column extends the basic model
introducing two interactions: one between the entry dummy and the pre-entry market share (for those enter with
branches), the other between the dummy for being an incumbent without branches and the market share. Column
five introduces customer turnover, while the last considers both the effects of market share and turnover.
Equation (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
CONSTANT -12.822 *** -10.411 *** -13.617 *** -13.163 *** -11.103 *** -10.810 ***
0.603 0.612 *** 0.586 0.581 0.594 0.588
MKT_SHARE -2.150 *** -2.141 *** -1.278 *** -0.940 *** -1.247 *** -0.898 ***
0.131 0.129 *** 0.135 0.137 0.132 0.134
ENTRY (0,1) 0.918 *** 1.037 ***
0.101 0.123 ***
ENTRY * TURNOVER (0,1) -0.451 ***
0.205
ENTRY_BR (0,1) 0.281 *** 0.329 *** 0.310 *** 0.391 ***
0.038 0.043 0.048 0.055
ENTRY_BR * TURNOVER (0,1) -0.089 *** -0.126 *
0.072 0.073
ENTRY_BR * PRE_MKT_SHARE -1.020 *** -1.676 ***
0.798 0.803
ENTRY_LOA (0,1) 1.368 *** 1.370 1.542 *** 1.548 ***
0.105 0.104 0.129 0.128
ENTRY_LOA * TURNOVER (0,1) -0.561 *** -0.566 ***
0.209 0.207
OUTLOANS (0,1) 0.688 *** 0.849 *** 0.719 *** 0.949 ***
0.033 0.035 0.039 0.043
OUTLOANS * TURNOVER (0,1) -0.010 -0.191 ***
0.052 0.054
OUTLOANS * MKT_SHARE -7.691 *** -7.611 ***
0.624 0.639
TURNOVER (0,1) 0.370 *** 0.397 *** 0.406 ***
0.023 0.024 0.024
MARKET_SIZE 0.128 *** 0.040 0.174 *** 0.169 *** 0.082 *** 0.081 ***
0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
NUMBER_BANKS 0.359 *** 0.284 *** 0.338 *** 0.316 *** 0.260 *** 0.246 ***
0.056 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.053
HERFINDAHL 6.426 *** 6.996 *** 6.377 *** 6.063 *** 7.004 *** 6.730 ***
0.353 0.349 0.343 0.342 0.339 0.338
LOAN_RATE 0.309 *** 0.258 *** 0.302 *** 0.297 *** 0.249 *** 0.247 ***
0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014Table VII – Continued
BANKRUPTCY 0.335 *** 0.334 *** 0.350 *** 0.325 *** 0.349 *** 0.329 ***
0.060 0.059 0.058 0.057 0.057 0.056
MARKET_OUTPUT -0.126 *** -0.200 *** -0.072 * -0.078 ** -0.150 *** -0.154 ***
0.040 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.038
DHERFINDAHL 2.696 *** 2.968 *** 2.970 *** 2.953 *** 3.302 *** 3.384 ***
0.714 0.702 0.694 0.692 0.680 0.679
DLOAN_RATE 0.216 *** 0.189 *** 0.210 *** 0.217 *** 0.182 *** 0.186 ***
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016
OUTPUT_SHOCK -0.072 *** -0.044 *** -0.076 *** -0.070 *** -0.048 *** -0.044 ***
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
BANK_SIZE -0.058 *** -0.059 *** -0.061 *** -0.059 *** -0.063 *** -0.063 ***
0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
BANK_CAPITAL -4.156 *** -4.115 *** -4.005 *** -4.302 *** -3.967 *** -4.204 ***
0.477 0.469 0.463 0.462 0.454 0.453
BANK_BADL 3.831 *** 3.904 *** 3.920 *** 3.893 *** 3.953 *** 3.971 ***
0.411 0.404 0.399 0.396 0.392 0.389
BANK_PROFIT -1.610 *** -1.518 *** -1.671 *** -1.571 ** -1.572 *** -1.481 ***
0.128 0.126 0.124 0.123 0.122 0.121
DBANK_CAPITAL 2.571 *** 2.249 *** 2.118 *** 2.030 *** 1.774 *** 1.634 ***
0.533 0.525 0.518 0.513 0.509 0.504
DBANK_PROFIT -0.277 ** -0.209 ** -0.407 *** -0.302 *** -0.336 *** -0.261 **
0.133 0.131 0.129 0.128 0.127 0.126
COOPERATIVE (0,1) -0.070 *** -0.069 *** -0.086 *** -0.090 *** -0.084 *** -0.089 ***
0.034 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032
COMMUNITY (0,1) -0.451 *** -0.410 *** -0.384 *** -0.357 *** -0.342 *** -0.321 ***
0.087 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082
Adj. R-squared 0.332 0.355 0.372 0.385 0.397 0.409
N. of observations 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275
N. of local markets 95 95 95 95 95 95
N. of banks 729 729 729 729 729 729
*** , ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test against a null
of  0.0.Table VIII
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE:
THE EFFECT OF ENTRY IN THE COVARIATE MODEL
The table reports the smearing estimates of the effect of entry by acquiring a positive market share on the loan
default rate, based on the regression coefficients shown in the first column of Table VII. The computation






Mean values 3.78 4.15 8.03
25° perc. 75° perc. 25° perc. 75° perc. 25° perc. 75° perc.
BANKS 3.44 4.17 3.78 4.57 7.37 8.76
HERFINDAHL 3.14 4.17 3.45 4.57 6.78 8.75
LOAN_RATE 2.95 4.79 3.24 5.25 6.40 9.91
BANKRUPTCY 3.62 3.94 3.97 4.32 7.71 8.33
MARKET_OUTPUT 3.91 3.69 4.29 4.05 8.27 7.85
DHERFINDAHL 3.72 3.88 4.08 4.25 7.91 8.21
DLOAN_RATE 3.51 4.15 3.86 4.55 7.50 8.71
OUTPUT_SHOCK 3.96 3.61 4.34 3.96 8.35 7.69
BANK_CAPITAL 3.98 3.64 4.37 3.99 8.41 7.75
BANK_BADL 3.43 3.99 3.76 4.37 7.34 8.41
BANK_PROFITS 4.19 3.59 4.59 3.94 8.80 7.65
DBANK_CAPITAL 3.68 3.87 4.04 4.24 7.84 8.19
DBANK_PROFIT 3.83 3.73 4.20 4.09 8.12 7.91
COOPERATIVE 3.61 3.96 7.69
COMMUNITY 3.37 3.71 7.24Table IX
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE:
THE EFFECT OF ENTRY WITH BRANCHES IN THE COVARIATE MODEL
The table reports the smearing estimates of the effect of entry with branches on the loan default rate, based on the










Mean values 2.83 3.23 4.00
25° perc. 75° perc. 25° perc. 75° perc. 25° perc. 75° perc.
BANKS 2.58 3.12 2.94 3.56 3.65 4.39
HERFINDAHL 2.33 3.13 2.66 3.57 3.31 4.41
LOAN_RATE 2.19 3.62 2.50 4.11 3.11 5.07
BANKRUPTCY 2.70 2.96 3.08 3.38 3.81 4.18
MARKET_OUTPUT 2.89 2.79 3.29 3.18 4.07 3.94
DHERFINDAHL 2.78 2.91 3.17 3.32 3.92 4.11
DLOAN_RATE 2.62 3.11 2.99 3.54 3.71 4.38
OUTPUT_SHOCK 2.98 2.68 3.39 3.06 4.20 3.80
BANK_CAPITAL 2.98 2.72 3.40 3.10 4.21 3.85
BANK_BADL 2.54 3.00 2.90 3.42 3.60 4.22
BANK_PROFITS 3.17 2.67 3.61 3.05 4.46 3.78
DBANK_CAPITAL 2.77 2.89 3.16 3.29 3.91 4.07
DBANK_PROFIT 2.89 2.76 3.29 3.15 4.07 3.90
COOPERATIVE 2.66 3.04 3.76
COMMUNITY 2.55 2.92 3.62Table X
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE:
THE EFFECT OF ENTRY WITHOUT BRANCHES IN THE COVARIATE MODEL
The table reports the quantitative assessment of the effect of entry without branches on the loan default rate, based
on the regression coefficients shown in the third column of Table VII. The computation technique is the same









Mean values 5.43 5.51 8.97
25° perc. 75° perc. 25° perc. 75° perc. 25° perc. 75° perc.
BANKS 4.97 5.95 5.05 6.04 8.28 9.75
HERFINDAHL 4.52 5.97 4.59 6.06 7.58 9.78
LOAN_RATE 4.26 6.82 4.33 6.92 7.18 11.03
BANKRUPTCY 5.19 5.67 5.26 5.75 8.60 9.33
MARKET_OUTPUT 5.53 5.35 5.62 5.44 9.13 8.86
DHERFINDAHL 5.33 5.58 5.41 5.66 8.83 9.20
DLOAN_RATE 5.05 5.93 5.13 6.02 8.40 9.73
OUTPUT_SHOCK 5.69 5.17 5.78 5.25 9.37 8.58
BANK_CAPITAL 5.70 5.23 5.79 5.31 9.39 9.68
BANK_BADL 4.91 5.73 4.99 5.81 8.19 9.42
BANK_PROFITS 6.03 5.14 6.12 5.22 9.87 8.53
DBANK_CAPITAL 5.31 5.53 5.39 5.61 8.80 9.12
DBANK_PROFIT 5.53 5.31 5.61 5.39 9.13 8.79
COOPERATIVE 5.13 5.20 8.51
COMMUNITY 4.93 5.01 8.22Table XI
EFFECT OF ENTRY ON INCUMBENTS’ DEFAULT RATE
The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, for equations
(7) to (10). The regressions are estimated with weighted least square logit for grouped data. The (0,1) notation
indicates a dummy variable. Dummy variables for banks and markets are not reported. The dependent variable is
the log-odds ratio of the loan default rate of incumbents. The first two columns report the estimated coefficients
of the equations where entry is defined as the acquisition of a positive market share during the period 1986-1991.
The second column adds to the basic model the interaction between entry and customer turnover. Columns from
three to four distinguish between entrants with and without branches. The fourth column introduces the
interactions of the two types of entry with customer turnover.
Equation (7) (8) (9) (10)
CONSTANT -8.458 *** -8.043 *** -8.198 *** -7.602 ***
0.620 0.654 0.623 0.648
MKT_SHARE -2.442 *** -2.420 *** -2.390 *** -2.363 ***
0.152 0.153 0.153 0.153
OUTLOANS 0.674 *** 0.675 *** 0.677 *** 0.681 ***
0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
N_ENTRANTS -0.191 *** -0.224 ***
0.036 0.040
N_ENTRANTS_LOA -0.111 *** -0.100 ***
0.028 0.037








TURNOVER (0,1) 0.337 *** 0.004 ** 0.344 *** -0.115
0.025 0.170 0.025 0.146
MARKET_SIZE 0.071 ** 0.038 0.067 ** -0.017
0.030 0.034 0.029 0.036
NUMBER_BANKS 0.199 *** 0.232 *** 0.227 *** 0.282 ***
0.056 0.059 0.057 0.059
HERFINDAHL 4.785 *** 4.733 *** 4.965 *** 4.451 ***
0.351 0.352 0.352 0.373
LOAN_RATE 0.107 *** 0.108 *** 0.091 *** 0.115 ***
0.011 0.011 0.012 0.013
BANKRUPTCY 0.350 *** 0.357 *** 0.319 *** 0.344 ***
0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060
MARKET_OUTPUT -0.111 ** -0.140 *** -0.088 * -0.160 ***
0.044 0.046 0.044 0.048
OUTPUT_SHOCK -0.016 ** -0.014 * -0.019 *** -0.006
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Adj. R-squared 0.586 0.586 0.587 0.588
N. of observations 5,244 5,244 5,244 5,244
N. of local markets 95 95 95 95
N. of banks 726 726 726 726
*** , ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test against a null
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